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This article aims to present reasonable arguments for an extension of the 3R principles used in 
research to the regulation of farm animal welfare. It aspires to expound the level of legal 
protection in the field of research and to analyze whether these means of protection have 
contributed to a perceptible amelioration of animal welfare in the respective field. In the same 
course, it pays attention to exploring the reasons for the emergence of 3R in research. The article 
then seeks to identify the existing levels of protection in the field of farming. Most notably, it 
aims at presenting the differences of legal protection for animals in research and for animals in 
farming and at depicting the reasons for according such different means of protection to the 
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animals in question. This analysis shall form the basis of exploring the reasonable possibility of 
applying the principles in research to the animals used for farming purposes and of establishing a 
common underlying legal maxim. Finally, it aspires to exemplify specific applications of the 
principle of 3R to farmed animals. 
The article first and foremost engages in legal arguments, and legal consistency arguments 
more specifically: It argues that if we accept legal norm X for reasons Y applicable to one group 
of animals, then we must – on pain of logical inconsistency – accept legal norm X for another 
group of animals satisfying preconditions Y, too. The article therefore does not assume or 
endorse any particular school of thought in moral philosophy or the philosophy of law. 
In the first part of this article, the legal regulation of animal welfare is analyzed in the field 
of research. First, it is identified how the 3R principles emerged and how they are codified and 
implemented in states’ legislations today. Subsequently, the 3R principles, namely refinement, 
reduction, and replacement, are presented in detail with an examination of their failures and 
achievements.  
In the second part of the article, the prevalent situation of animals in farming is clarified. 
Legal arguments are appraised in order to examine whether an analogous application is 
reasonable and feasible, i.e. the extension of 3R in research to the regulation of the majority of all 
domesticated animals. Thereupon, it is substantiated what refinement in farming specifically 
encompasses. For these purposes, the existing law in the U.S. is compared with Switzerland’s 
provisions, including normative statements. Second, policy arguments and modalities of 
reduction in farming are examined. Finally, the third element of 3R, namely replacement, is 
scrutinized in the field of farming against the background of the internationally ubiquitous legal 




2. The regulation of animal welfare in research 
 
 2.1. Facts and definitions underlying the 3R principles 
 
Research is well known for sparking critical debates when it comes to animal welfare. For many 
people, it is by far the primary example of the flagrant exploitation of animals for human 
purposes. Animal research is at the center of public discussion on a constant basis, and their 
exploitation has been questioned since Russell and Burch’s (1959) ‘The Principles of Humane 
Experimental Technique’.
2
 This publication has played a key role in introducing 3R in research 
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and animals have profited from this attention in such a way that today, research is, globally, one 
of the most regulated domains with regard to animal welfare.
3
 
Hereinafter and throughout this article, the term ‘research’ will be used as a notion referring 
to both basic and applied scientific research of any kind that either harms animals or entails a 
reasonable possibility of harming them, if not differentiated explicitly. 
2.2. An introduction to the 3R principles in research 
In 1959, English zoologist and psychologist William M. S. Russell and microbiologist Rex L. 
Burch published guidelines on how to reduce the suffering of animals used for research by 
evaluating the degree of humaneness of animal treatment in experiments.
4
  
The first guiding principle, refinement, comprehends humanitarian approaches that aspire 
to decrease incidence and severity of experiments and vivisection.
5
 Refinement comprises 
improvements of accommodation and living conditions, breeding, care, and the diminution of 
pain, fear, distress, and suffering.
6
 Accordingly, refinement primarily includes the use of 
anesthesia and analgesia.
7
 Refinement also calls for less invasive procedures to be employed, e.g. 
by replacing injection with inhalation.
8
 In addition, monitoring equipment is introduced in order 
to properly assess the animals’ physiological state.
9
  
Second, the principle of reduction prompts scientists to use the smallest number of animals 
while achieving high-quality results.
10
 Aside from questioning the necessity of the number of 
animals used in research, reduction shall be achieved through controlling and reducing variance 
via inbred strains, as well as by means of better design and analysis of experiments.
11
 For 
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instance, in toxicity testing the limit test ousted the heavily criticized LD50 test and hence 
provided a trustable basis to use fewer animals while attaining more accurate results.
12
  
Finally, the principle of replacement challenges the use of animals whenever feasible 
alternatives are available.
13
 Over the course of the last decades it has become apparent that 
animal experimentation, to a high degree, is unsuitable for human ends. For instance, animal 
subjects have misled researchers about the mechanisms of infection, surgery replacement of 
clogged arteries, kidney transplants, hormone replacement therapy, Viagra, anti-inflammatory 
drugs, and the reproduction of cirrhosis.
14
 It is frequently argued that animals and humans lack 
the essential biological, emotional, and cognitive similarities needed to extrapolate results 
successfully.
15
 Additionally, researchers are increasingly skeptical of the use of animal models 
for the understanding, treatment and curing of cancer, AIDS, psychological disorders, drug abuse, 
and genetic diseases, as well as in toxicity tests.
16
 On this basis, modern animal research demands 
the use of non-sentient substitutes where they are readily available.
17
 Sample methods of 
replacement include the use of epidemiology, studies on patients, autopsies and biopsies, as well 
as post-marketing surveillance.
18
 Instead of using a large number of animals in toxicology tests, 
cellular screening tests now allow for more efficient methods and substantial savings, just as 
trauma training now is instilled by means of a simulator.
19
 Replacement measures also include 
lab-grown human livers, in vitro 2D human skin tissue, non-invasive brain scanning methods, 
and computer simulations.
20
 In general, scientific papers in different fields generate the 
knowledge to render the use of animals in research to a large extent inutile. 
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2.3. Achievements of the 3R principles in research 
3R, enjoying acceptance by the broad public, have been adopted and fostered by well-known 
advocates as well as by prominent organizations. On the international plane, the World 
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), which has carried animal welfare as its mandate since 
2005, explicitly recognizes the 3Rs.
21
 Also the Basel Declaration specially highlights the 
importance of 3R principles and the need for greater transparency.
22
 On a regional level, the 
European Convention for the Protection of Vertebrate Animals Used for Experimental and Other 
Scientific Purposes has implemented the 3R principles,
23
 as did Directive 2010/63/EU, stating 
that ‘animals have an intrinsic value which must be respected’ and ‘should always be treated as 
sentient creatures’.
24
 Moreover, the European Commission set up the European Center for the 
Validation of Alternative Methods. On the national level, the 3R principles have been given 
consideration in the U.S. Federal Research Policy.
25
 The U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) 
established the Interagency Coordinating Committee on the Validation of Alternative Methods 
(ICCVAM)
26
 and enacted the ‘Guide to the Care and Use of Laboratory Animals’ for refinement 
measures.
27
 Most recently, the NIH decided to significantly reduce the number of chimpanzees 
for research.
28
 Also in Japan, 3R are implemented in major legal documents.
29
 The Chinese 
Ministry of Science drastically improved the protection of laboratory animals by the adoption of 
the ‘Guiding Opinion on the Humane Treatment of Laboratory Animals’ in 2006 that endorses 
the 3R.
30
 In Australia, each of the eight states and territories has enacted the ‘Code of Practice for 
the Care and Use of Animals for Scientific Purposes’ that follows the 3R method.
31
 The UK has 
accepted and incorporated the 3R principles,
32
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 Furthermore, ethics committees have been established in the UK, Sweden, 
Croatia, and Switzerland.
37
 In addition, most recent documents and declarations relating to 
research activities show a positive development towards incorporating the principle of 
proportionality (that will be dealt with later in the article) in addition to 3R for the purposes of 
guaranteeing a balance of interests.
38
 
Despite obstacles concerning its implementation,
39
 the legal enshrinement of 3R has 
obtained perceptible success: in Europe, the use of animals for research has been reduced by 50% 
since 1970, and in the U.S. by 25% since 1985.
40
 
3. The regulation of animal welfare in farming 
 
3.1. Facts and definitions underlying animal welfare in farming 
 
The most considerable attributes of factory farming and its concomitant effects on animal welfare 
will be outlined hereafter. As more and more states strive towards intensifying the businesses 
pertaining to the agricultural use of animals, the impacts of such enterprises, as representatives of 
an upcoming quasi international practice, have to be thoroughly detected and assessed. In the 
United States, the practices are analyzed with a focus on land farm animals such as birds, pigs, 
and cows. It should be highlighted that other species increasingly are reared in factory systems, 
such as sheep, rabbits, alligators, and bears.
41
 Of equal importance is the awareness that 
corresponding situations exist in every part of the world where concentrated factory farming, i.e. 
most intensive forms of farming, prevails. 
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Today there is a clear worldwide trend towards the disappearance of small farms and the 
increase of factory farms,
42
 where thousands of animals are housed indoors at high densities.
43
 By 
definition, Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFOs)
44
 are designed to deprive animals 
of the space that enables them to move, even to turn around, and thus to exhibit natural 
behavior.
45
 As a result, farmed animals suffer from numerous chronic and production-related 
diseases,
46
 such as liver abscesses, mastitis, ascites, lameness, and uterine prolapse.
47
 Artificial 
acceleration and hence the resultant reduction of their lifespans give rise to cardiovascular, 
skeletal, and respiratory diseases, as well as leg deformities.
48
 Where workers wear gas masks, 
animals are forced to endure ammonia, pollutants, and the smell of urine and feces perpetually 
and hence suffer from pneumonia.
49
 Moreover, animals are increasingly victims of mutilation: 
tails are docked, beaks, teeth and toes are clipped, ears are notched, horns are removed, and 
castration is undertaken without anesthesia.
50
 In addition, farmed animals experience forced 
molting and generally are no longer fed what they were genetically designed to eat, resulting in 
serious damage to their digestive systems.
51
 Unsurprisingly, the cramped conditions also give rise 
to animals suffering stereotypic behavior, ’mourning’, lethal stress syndrome, aggression, 
frustration, and thereby physical injury.
52
 
Furthermore, producers are under increased pressure to keep up with the growing demand 
for meat, poultry, eggs, and milk. In a production facility, where minimum input and maximum 
output are the only determinatives, it is commonplace that illnesses, diseases, and mortality are 
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ignored as long as the output augments.
53
 In other words, the goal is to keep animals alive in 
conditions that would otherwise kill them.
54
  
Aside from these grievances, unnecessary violence is often witnessed when visiting 
slaughterhouses. In one third of American slaughterhouses it is common to find acts of deliberate 
cruelty.
55
 Employees cut off ears, smash heads, drop chute gates, knock animals in the eye, jump 
on them, drop-kick them like footballs, slam them into walls, rip off their heads, suffocate them 
by tying latex gloves over their heads, or throw live chickens into giant fans.
56
  
Another issue is that the personnel performing slaughter are subject to issues of time 
pressure. The fact that more animals need to be killed within less time results in sloppy stunning 
and slaughtering. The number of animals experiencing death in a conscious state of mind is 
higher than expected:
57
 Cows are unsuccessfully bolted and electrocuted, pigs anesthetized by 
carbon dioxide suffocate whilst others regain consciousness after experiencing electric current, 
and chickens are rendered immobile but not insensible before being killed.
58
 One might even 
argue that it has become commonplace for animals to be killed while fully conscious.
59
 As 
workers in slaughter facilities say: ‘Happens all the time.’
60
 
3.2. Why should the 3R principles be applied to farmed animals? 
Compared with the situation in research, a legal approach towards farm animal welfare maxims is 
hampered by three main forces. First, many national laws exempt farm practices from applicable 
animal welfare acts or related regulation.
61
 Thus, they can neither be regulated nor reviewed by a 
legal body. Second, states that possess farm animal welfare legislation regulate the issue to a far 
lesser extent, as well as with lower levels of specificity and regulatory density compared with 
research animal welfare. Third, the fact that 3R is employed only for animals used in research 
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creates a situation for farmed animals in which they are discriminated: those animals are not 
accorded an elaborate and comprehensive body of laws and, as a consequence, there is no 
thorough analysis of their minimization in number, pain intensity, severity, and their 
substitutability as there is for research animals. For example, the European Convention for the 
Protection of Animals kept for Farming Purposes
62
 comprises seven provisions followed by 
implementation articles, while the European Convention for the Protection of Vertebrate Animals 
used for Experimental and Other Scientific Purposes
63
 encompasses a set of 38 articles and an 
appendix for the accommodation and care of animals. Hence, the level of specificity of the 
regulation and its regulatory density are prima facie much lower than in research. While the latter 
convention includes a preamble emphasizing the moral obligations of humans to respect all 
animals and to have due consideration of their capacity for suffering and memory, the former 
does not offer a similar instrument.
64
 This very preamble also sets priorities as it underlines that 
the use of research animals first of all must be justified, and second it can be justified only if an 
overall benefit for humans or animals is acquired.
65
 In the farm animal convention, the use of 
these animals does not need to be justified, and there are no specified purposes to kill animals. 
Furthermore, the need to replace the animals is not reinforced and new alternative measures are 
not fostered.
66
 Farm animals’ unnecessary suffering is only mentioned where freedom of 
movement or food or liquid is affected.
67
 Such legal degradation of farm animals compared with 
those used for research purposes constitutes a perceptible discrimination, clearly existing in 
national legal orders, too. The situation is particularly serious as the use of animals for food is by 
far the largest cause for animal abuse.
68
 Additionally, the scope of application of the regulatory 
fields in comparison with their regulatory levels stands in a stark disproportion. For the research 
industry, an estimated 115 million animals are used annually.
69
 Nonetheless, they represent only 
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one percent of the animals killed each year for food.
70
 Farming affects 98% of all domesticated 
animals.
71
 Dismantled, that equals about six million farm animals killed every hour.
72
 
So what is the reason for according animals in research a better, more comprehensive, and 
justiciable protection? Furthermore, are there well-founded reasons for drawing such an 
articulative and momentous distinction between the two groups of animals?  
Russell and Burch clearly stated that the high number of animals affected and the severity 
with which they encounter stress is a humanitarian problem, be it animals in research or be it 
farm animals.
73
 From their perspective, human recognition of animal sentience is the main 
driving force for establishing the 3R in research. Today, the preamble of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Vertebrate Animals used for Experimental and Other Scientific 
Purposes embodies and expressly states the underlying rationale of the legal protection: It 
recognizes ‘that man has a moral obligation to respect all animals and to have due consideration 
for their capacity for suffering and memory’
74
. § 1 of the German Animal Welfare Act declares 
that its aim ‘is to protect the lives and well-being of animals, based on the responsibility of 
human beings for their fellow creatures. No one may cause an animal pain, suffering or harm 
without good reason’
75
. Also in Austria, no one may kill an animal without a reasonable reason.
76
 
Art. 4 para. 2 of the Swiss Animal Welfare act states that ‘[n]o one may inflict pain, suffering or 




These recognitions of animal sentience and the closely related, expressly required 
reasonable justification for harming an animal embody the basic rationale for the protection of 
animals. Human concern for animal welfare and its resulting legal manifestation are based on the 
awareness and recognition that animals are sentient beings,
78
 as enshrined, notably, in art. 13 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [TFEU].
79
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Animal sentience is on a par with their capacity to feel and experience positive and 
negative emotions.
80
 From a neuroscientific perspective, animals are especially vulnerable to 
unpleasant conditions,
81
 since it seems that they experience a greater degree of suffering than 
humans while being less able to precisely locate the specific pain.
82
 
The respective legal documents recognizing animal sentience draw no distinction as to the 
animals’ designated use for humans. Thus, their basic rationale does not differentiate between 
farm animals and research animals. Rather, the ability to feel pain is inherent in farm animals, as 
it is in animals used for research. Both groups of animals encounter stress and suffering and, 
ultimately, experience slaughter and killing. Since the 3R were introduced in research for the 
primary purpose of reducing animal suffering, there exists no legitimate justification not to apply 
3R to farming, since farm animals also experience grave suffering. Therefore, reconsideration is 
needed, based on the existent acknowledgements of farm and research animals’ shared ability to 
suffer, which mediates a harmonization of the basic and general underlying principles applicable 
to the animals’ use. First, that justification is needed before the decision to harm an animal is 
made. Second, the 3R, which have proven fruitful for animals used in research,
83
 should be 
extended to farm animals. 
But does the shared ability of sense and feeling really constitute a well-founded basis 
wherefrom a legal duty may be deduced to extend the 3R principles to the regulation of farm 
animals?
 
In fact, most states already dispose of such a legal axiom that might be argued to make 
it mandatory to accord farm animals the application of 3R. The European Union, the Council of 
Europe, Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, India, Israel, Norway, the Philippines, 
South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and others have 
adopted the principle of the avoidance of unnecessary animal suffering,
84
 according to which no 
animal shall endure unnecessary pain, suffering, or harm. The principle is argued to have such a 
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worldwide application that it has become an international policy.
85
 Most notably, the principle 
applies to all species that are subject to painful sensations. The logical argumentum e contrario of 
the avoidance of unnecessary animal suffering demonstrates that states have set the goal to 
reduce avoidable animal suffering. The enshrinement of the recognition of animal sentience and 
the inclusion of the goal to reduce their suffering indicate that humans might not only have 
ethical responsibilities (as due diligence) towards animals,
86
 but they might, arguably, have a 




It might seem remarkable at this point to observe that the same species, for example cows, 
dogs, pigs, and horses, are used for research and farming purposes. Against this background, it 
becomes even more palpable how the future of an animal in either the field of research or farming 
and their respective protective regulations simply is a lottery. It follows that the prevailing 
practices of animal protection are, from an animal’s perspective, an expression of mere 
arbitrariness. 
In consideration of the aim of research - to save lives – and the aim of animal farming - to 
create culinary pleasure - it seems as if the application of 3R to farming is even more exigent, 
also in terms of its inimical ramifications.
88
 The rules set forth hereunder propose a catalogue of 
measures, deduced from the 3R principles in research and in conformity with the states’ 
commitment to avoid unnecessary animal suffering.
89
 
3.3. A proposal for the application of the principle of refinement in farming 
To a greater degree than all other principles, refinement is primarily used as a regulatory device 
to ameliorate the prevalent conditions and their severity to animals.
90
 Therefore, refinement 
provisions are characteristic for their detailed scope and density. Thus, in order for rather 
rudimentary regulation on refinement to be geared to a more developed legislation, in line with 
the obligation to refine, U.S. and Swiss law thereon are contrasted. 
In the U.S., no federal law regulates how animals raised for food are treated on the farm 
while being reared.
91
 Some federal acts nonetheless include provisions pertaining to slaughter, 
transportation, inspection, and pollution that touch on animal welfare: the U.S. federal 
government has enacted the Animal Welfare Act [AWA], the Twenty-Eight Hour Law,
92
 and the 
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Humane Methods of Slaughter Act [HMSA]
93
. However, those acts abound in exemptions: the 
AWA does not apply to farm animals;
94
 the Twenty-Eight Hour Law excludes its application for 
transport by truck, by air or on water;
95
 and the HMSA, which requires farm animals to be 




On a state level, animal anti-cruelty statutes are the primary method of regulating their 
welfare, with respect to farm animals, these statutes have generally exempted farm practices from 
their application.
97
 Additionally, sweeping exceptions exist in state transportation statutes, state 
humane slaughter laws, regulations of food safety, false advertising standards, concerning libel 
suits, nuisance claims, certification standards, provisions for retailers, etc.
98
 These exceptions 
have made farmed animals literally invisible within the U.S. legal system.  
By contrast, Switzerland’s legislation primarily deals with farm animals and their welfare 
in keeping, transport, and slaughter. The legislation of animal welfare in Switzerland is a duty of 
the Confederation, according to the Swiss constitution.
99
 The enforcement of the provisions, on 
the other hand, rests with the responsibility of the cantons.
100
 The Swiss Animal Welfare Act, 
enacted by the Swiss parliament, represents a legislative act of an outlining character only, 
containing 46 articles on its scope of application, its purpose, as well as basic principles. More 
specific and comprehensive provisions are provided by the respective Animal Welfare 
Ordinance, issued by the Swiss Federal Council, which complements and concretizes the Animal 
Welfare Act.
101
 Moreover, there are several additional ordinances substantiating the Animal 
Welfare Ordinance that are issued by the competent departments and agencies.
102
 
According to these provisions, animals generally must be kept in a way that does not 
interfere with their natural behavior.
103
 Farmers must provide animals with suitable places to eat, 
drink, defecate, rest, and retreat.
104
 Additionally, housing and enclosures must be spacious 
enough to allow for ‘species-typical’ behavior.
105
 Pigs, for example, should always have access to 
straw and roughage in order to engage in proper investigation and manipulation activities.
106
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 Tierschutzverordnung [TSchV] [Swiss Animal Welfare Ordinance] Apr. 23, 2008, SR 455.1, art. 3 para. 1 (Switz.) 
104
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Farm animals’ access to open space must be documented in a register, calves can be fixed at a 
maximum of 30 minutes a day, all animals must be able to lay down at the same time on bedded 
grounding, and precise provisions on tie-stalls must exist.
107
 Furthermore, animals shall have the 
opportunity to maintain social relations.
108
 In Switzerland, tails cannot be docked, and debeaking, 
teeth cutting, and branding are illegal.
109
 In the dairy industry, farmers are obliged to take Schalm 
tests once a month and to carry out somatic cell counts to check the cows’ udder health.
110
 The 
same regulation lists forbidden kinds of fodder.
111
 Moreover, calves have to be fed food 
containing sufficient iron.
112
 Livestock owners must display all pharmaceuticals given to the 
animals.
113
 In addition, the use of antibiotics and hormones is prohibited for stimulating 
production,
114
 including laying hens.
115
 Central to refinement is art. 16 of the Swiss Animal 




Relating to slaughter, the Swiss legislator introduced an article fixing the minimum amount 
of time for the meat inspection per carcass and ordering the operating business to adapt its 
slaughtering speed accordingly.
117
 Furthermore, the permits that slaughterhouses require are tied 
to a maximum slaughtering frequency per hour and per day.
118
 Most importantly, all mammals 
need to be rendered insensible before slaughter.
119
 This ‘privilege’ is also granted to birds as the 
principal subject of slaughter.
120
 Finally, only certain ways of killing animals are legitimate, 
specific to species (the methods of rendering an animal ‘insensible’ highly depend on the 
animals’ physiology) and only to be carried out by expert personnel.
121
 
Nonetheless, the majority of these provisions, despite being well regulated when compared 
with prevailing standards in other states, lack essential features to ensure animal welfare. Most 
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provisions are formulated in such an open and general manner that nearly every conduct can be 
justified.
122
 Also, should a provision appear unequivocal, there are exceptions to it.
123
 
However, the majority of states do not pursue a strict refinement approach as that of 
Switzerland, exempting essential elements on refinement
124
 or lacking legislation on farm 
animals altogether. This in turn has been motivating organizations to establish their own 
guidelines.
125
 A well-known example is the 1979 report by the Farm Animal Welfare Council of 
Great Britain, the so-called ‘Five Freedoms’, which include: 1) Freedom from Hunger and Thirst 
(food and water readily available), 2) Freedom from Discomfort (environment, resting area), 3) 
Freedom from Pain, Injury or Disease (diagnosis and treatment), 4) Freedom to Express Normal 
Behavior (space, facilities, company), and 5) Freedom from Fear and Distress (no mental 
suffering).
126
 Many countries that are not equipped with refinement standards refer to the Five 
Freedoms.
127
 According to the OIE, the Five Freedoms are internationally recognized for 
providing valuable guidance in animal welfare.
128
 The potential of the Five Freedoms, however, 
is limited, and one must not forget that they only help legislators and judges discern what 
constitutes animal interests in general. They are not designed to act as a counterpart to 3R in 
research as they do not provide rules on the legitimate uses of animals. Thus, they do not live up 
to the obligation to duly consider animal suffering and reduce it where avoidable.
129
 
3.4. The principle of reduction in farming 
 
3.4.1. Problems persisting with refinement in farming 
Even if states were to impose a comprehensive implementation of refinement measures, a number 
of major problems persist, since the demand for animal products is notorious for its constant 
escalation entailing far-reaching consequences. 
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 Since 1960, the global population has increased from 3 billion to around 7 billion 
people.
130
 Disproportionately, however, meat production has tripled since 1960 and egg 
production has increased fourfold.
131
 The danger of these high demands and the resultant sinking 
prices is that the product’s market value is way below its cost of production, even more due to 
substantial federal subsidies.
132
 The resultant ever-increasing consumption of animal products, 
accounting for a huge part of the world’s crop production,
133
 affects cereal prices as it depletes 
the grain for direct consumption by people.
134
 The Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) announced that by 2050, the world will need to produce 70% more food 
for an additional 2.3 billion people.
135
 In terms of meat, an additional 50% will have to be 
manufactured, due to an increase in consumption from 41 to 52 kg per caput (30 to 44 kg in 
developing countries).
136
 By 2050, according to the FAO’s report, developing countries will 
consume 72% of the world’s meat production.
137
 Concerns about the current use of animals thus 
are not only an issue for developed countries, but have evolved into a global problem.
138
 The crux 
of this increase is the notorious domination of animal products over global environmental 
calamity.
139
 Animal products comprise 70% of the global freshwater consumption, 38% of the 
total land use, and 14% of the world’s greenhouse gases.
140
 Meat and dairy products use more 
resources, cause higher emissions, and hold a disproportionally larger share of environmental 
impacts than plant-based alternatives.
141
 The high demand for water and protein-rich plants when 
producing meat easily threatens agriculture and drinking water supplies, for meat-based diets 
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simply detract more from global food and water supply than they provide.
142
 The massive 
amounts of manure, even more polluting due to the use of antibiotics as feed additives, 
overwhelm the environment and its natural cleansing.
143
 Feed imports render ground application 
of manure impossible and give rise to the creation of artificial lagoons of manure, which then 
pollute ground water.
144
 Also, livestock currently are responsible for more greenhouse gas 
emissions than the worldwide transport sector:
145
 methane and carbon dioxide are produced while 
digesting, and nitrous oxide is omitted when manure degrades microbially.
146
 The outcome of this 
is climate change that adversely affects food security, falling disproportionally on the poor: ‘Sub-
Saharan Africa’s share in the global number of hungry people could rise from 24 percent to 
between 40 and 50 percent’.
147
 
Moreover, the widespread abuse of antibiotics, antimicrobials, and hormones to increase 
performance causes antimicrobial resistance in bacteria.
148
 The resulting resistance reservoirs 
represent a high public health concern and global threat to food security.
149
 Those microbial 
infections also raise the probability of new resistant strains ‘jumping’ between species and have 
recently been declared epidemic.
150
 
Most importantly, there are serious adverse effects on animal welfare: the cost-
effectiveness of CAFOs causes an increase of the feed conversion ratio, i.e. today, a five pound 
hen is raised within 45 days, whereas in 1950, it took 84 days for it to be fully grown.
151
 The 
pressure to keep up with the demand ultimately rests on the animals.
152
 They essentially are bred 
to be machines in order to keep up with the massive worldwide demand. 
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3.4.1. A proposal for the application of the principle of reduction in farming 
One way of minimizing major CAFO-related risks is the reduction of animals kept per CAFO 
unit. The average farm in the U.S. boasts half a million pigs,
153
 and hen facilities house more than 
150,000 hens.
154
 By contrast, in Switzerland the maximum stock level a factory is allowed to run 
is fixed to 1,500 pigs, 18,000 laying hens or 300 calves.
 155
 However, fixed stock levels do not 
necessarily impact the overall number of animals used. Rather, reduction essentially accounts for 
a more profound measure. 
To recap the conclusions from 3R in research: in this area of law it is commonly 
acknowledged that the numbers of animals should significantly be reduced, as harming the 
animals is problematic and should be avoided. Based on reduction, science manages to maintain 
high quality results whilst harming fewer animals. Now if we as consumers can make perfectly 
well whilst harming significantly fewer animals and simultaneously sparing the environment and 
reducing world hunger, then we legally (based on the legal recognition of animal sentience and 
the legal enshrinement of the principle of the avoidance of unnecessary animal suffering)
156
 ought 
to reduce the numbers now, predicated on 3R. This argument is fully in line with our recognition 
of farm animals’ sentience that forecloses any possibility of ignoring their suffering solely for 
gastronomic pleasure or profit.
157
 Eventually, the price we have to pay for the benefits accrued is 
too high, for the animals directly and also for our health, environment, cohabitants and indirectly 
in terms of the degradation of our own dignity.
158
 Given the substantial arguments that severely 
put the extent of current farming methods and their ever-increasing number into question, 
governments might establish new priorities in agricultural research.
159
 Accordingly, the UN 
stated that living meat and dairy-free on a global scale is essential to save the world from hunger, 
poverty, and adverse effects of climate change.
160
 
3.5. A proposal for the application of the principle of replacement in farming 
Despite the adoption of necessary refinement and reduction measures, there are massive 
objections to the use of animals in farming facilities based on a number of principles.  
In law, whenever two divergent interests clash, the principle of proportionality will come to 
application. Many national laws encompass the principle as a directly applicable axiom 
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throughout their entire legal order, especially European countries.
161
 However, also in common 
law countries the proportionality analysis is well established.
162
 The principle of proportionality 
does not only enjoy application in foro domestico, but also on a supranational level and has been 
applied and established by the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, 
the International Court of Justice, and the World Trade Organization.
163 
The principle is a ‘key 
aspect of contemporary legal thought’ that is marked by a ‘continuity over several centuries’, 
driving ‘convergence of common law and civil law into a globalized jus commune’, toward 
‘uniform global rules’.
164
 The concept of proportionality is enjoying a worldwide appearance and 
representing such elementary considerations of humanity that it qualifies as a general principle of 
international law.
165
 As a general principle of international law, endorsed in art. 38 (1) c of the 
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Statute of the International Court of Justice, the proportionality principle is given a certain 
normative character by referring to it.
166
 Qualifying as a source of international law, the 
international law norm is implemented in the domestic sphere either by adopting it as a national 
norm such as in monist legal systems, or transforming it into a dualist states’ legal system, in 
order to bring about a reciprocal relationship of international law and national law.
167
 The 
respective overlapping of the municipal and international law norm of proportionality has 
become demonstrative of an emergent global constitutionalism, as an over-arching and hence 
self-perpetuating principle.
168
 Therefore, states must act in a rational and reasonable manner 
towards achieving a permissible goal without unduly encroaching interests.
169
  
In fact, it is argued that the existence of the principle of proportionality does not even stand 
to question.
170
 Yet, due to its widespread application in various areas, the ascertainment of its 
specific content in a given situation is a task that may not be underestimated.
171
 Nonetheless, 
similar concerns shall neither diminish the scope of the principle’s application, nor shall they 
disregard the obligation to apply it in the first place. Therefore, it remains necessary to analyze its 
precise content and then to employ it to the situation in question. 
The principle of proportionality conceptually comprehends three elements: suitability, 
necessity, and proportionality strictu sensu.
172
 The criterion of suitability requires the measure in 
question to be appropriate to achieve the ends desired. Necessity calls for the mildest means, 
meaning that there is no less onerous way to the objective. This criterion ensures that no 
excessive effects are imposed on those most affected.
173
 Proportionality strictu sensu finally 
incorporates a duty to diligently balance different interests affected by the act at hand.
174
 
First, pursuant to suitability, it might be argued that using another sentient being for 
convenience, convention and amusement is an adequate measure to achieve the aim of being fed, 
well dressed, and entertained. Yet, relating to necessity, it is maintained that healthy nutrition 
does not imperatively include meat, poultry, or fish in order to secure the required level of 
protein.
175
 Indeed, the consumption of animals or animal products is increasingly considered 
detrimental to human health. By contrast, vegan and vegetarian diets are beneficial to the 
prevention and treatment of certain diseases, are healthy, nutritionally adequate, and appropriate 
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for all stages of the human life cycle.
176
 The benefits encompass high levels of potassium, 
phytochemicals, folate, Vitamins C and E, low levels of saturated fat, lower body mass index, 
less heart disease, lower blood cholesterol levels, lower blood pressure and hypertensions, less 
type 2 diabetes, and reduced prostate and colon cancers.
177
 Meat can be easily substituted by soy 
and seitan, for example, since they are perfect resources for protein. Aside from vegan and 
vegetarian alternatives to the consumption of animal products, research has been remarkably 
successful in generating in-vitro meat. Scientists have already produced small amounts of muscle 
tissue in laboratories, i.e. edible meat.
178
 The usual lab meat procedure requires stem cells to be 
isolated, proliferated and coaxed into muscle cells.
179
 A major advantage of cultured meat 
technology is that it offers an alternative production route that detracts a proportion of resources 
used for conventional meat production. Moreover, its present exorbitant costs are said to decrease 
quickly with demand, just as when the first computer was introduced.
180
 It follows that the 
necessity of animal-based diets is to be reappraised. Necessity should not be interpreted 
dependent on society’s perception, but in fact should pay deference to the readily available 
alternatives.
181
 Today, we are spoilt with excellent alternatives to eat, to wear, and to be amused 
by without the need to cause pain and suffering to animals. Thus, the current suffering caused to 
animals is avoidable. Nevertheless, the demand that humanity ceases to eat meat is prima facie 
deemed drastic, although unlike the actual eating of meat does not require the killing of sentient 
beings beforehand, which in itself is actually a rather radical demand. At this point, replacement 
in farming must be compared with the 3R in research: society and the law accept and foster the 
demand to replace potentially life-saving research, whereas it commonly is deemed radical to 
replace easily substitutable culinary pleasure, which is actually the weaker demand. Causing 
unnecessary pain, on the other hand, is the most eccentric of all moral principles.
182
 As the High 
Court of India has stated, ‘the Constitution of India does not permit any citizen to claim that it is 
his fundamental right to take life and kill animals’.
183
 Most notably, a crucial difference exists 
between animals in research and animals used for consumption: in research, many scientists insist 
on the irreplaceability of animals in particular fields of study, whereas in the sector of food and 
clothing, no irreplaceability of animal products exists. Hence, overall, ‘it is difficult to argue that 
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anything we do to farmed animals is more necessary than anything else, since none of it is 
actually necessary at all.’
184
  
The last element of proportionality, namely proportionality strictu sensu essentially 
encompasses a balance of interests, posing a difficult task as the interests of one subject by 
tradition are deemed higher than those of the opposing subject. However, a balance of interests is 
a priori not a balance if the determining factors are interpreted for the benefit of one party 
beforehand. Today, virtually every human use of animals is deemed vital enough to trump animal 
concerns, as long as it produces some human benefit. Already today, some legal orders, such as 
the German Animal Welfare Act and the Austrian Federal Act on the Protection of Animals, view 
such an ‘automatic trumping process’ as contrary to law. Instead, it is required to provide a 
‘reasonable reason’ that justifies the killing of animals.
185
 Thus, a sensible balance of animal and 
human interests is necessitated, in line with the principle of proportionality strictu sensu. 
Certainly humans’ choice of consumption is restricted by prohibiting them to participate in taking 
animals’ lives. However, the harm we would endure by not consuming animal products is prima 
facie not comparable with the harm inflicted upon farm animals.
186
 Most importantly, the 
application of the principle of proportionality does not only require a balance of interests in 
quantitative, but also in qualitative terms. Qualitatively, the interest in remaining alive certainly 
rates higher than the interest in eating, dressing, and being entertained in a certain, easily 
remunerable manner.
187
 The difference in quality of the interests at stake are so massive that the 
legal status of the interest holder should not predetermine the outcome, especially in light of the 
animals’ sentience, as recognized by notable legal orders.
188
 
An outstanding example for the application of the principle of proportionality is posed by 
the HCJ 9232/01 Noah v. Att’y General PD (2002-2003) case before the Israeli Supreme Court. 
The court carefully examined the proportionality when ruling over the ban of foie gras 
production, despite the fact that this industry was the fourth largest in the world.
189
 Justice 
Strasberg-Cohen explained that ‘[t]he “production of food” will have greater weight the more the 
food item is necessary for human existence’
190
.  She stated that ‘[the regulations] do not establish 
the means that will minimize the injury, nor do they answer the test of proportionality, which 
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measures the relation between the benefit and the harm’.
191
 Also, Justice Eliezer Rivlin applied a 
proportionality test when promulgating that gastronomic pleasure cannot justify the ‘pain 
inflicted upon them by physical injury or by violent intrusion into their bodies’
192
. Finally, Justice 
Grunis approached the proportionality test by questioning an activity that causes avoidable 
animal suffering, thus assessing its necessity.
193
  The Court then declared the regulations on 
force-feeding geese invalid.  
The U.S. Congress assessed a practice’s necessity when they banned the slaughter of horses 
for food.
194
 Senator Landrieu said ‘The practice of horse slaughter for human consumption is 
revolting to me as a horse owner, but also as a consumer’.
195
 The Illinois Court of Appeals 
expressed its view with the words: ‘A state is permitted, within reason, to express disgust at what 
people do with the dead, whether dead human beings or dead animals.’
196
 
These examples pave the way for other states to apply the principle of proportionality, as a 
municipal or international law norm, when addressing the legality of the current use of animals. It 
is self-explanatory that the principle of proportionality does not automatically produce a general 
outcome of the evaluation of all farm practices. Rather, the principle demands a thorough case-
by-case analysis of each of its sub-principles, taking into account the circumstances of a practice, 
possible implications of a finding, alternatives to prevailing practices, as well as a cross-cultural 
comparison. 
Moreover, replacement must be aspired to on the grounds of another principle. Almost 
everyone accepts the abstract position that animals ought to be treated humanely and ought not to 
experience unnecessary suffering. Most states have adopted the principle of unnecessary 
suffering as a legal standard in their laws (Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, India, 
Israel, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the 
U.S., and others), as did the European Union and the Council of Europe, thus representing a 
global axiom.
197
 The European Convention for the Protection of Animals for Slaughter gives a 
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definition on stunning that ends with the words ‘thus sparing it [the animal] in any event any 
avoidable suffering.’
198
 The commitment of states to reduce animal suffering and the 
international policy of humane treatment of animals
199
 are not paradigms for utopia, but serious, 
meaningful short- and long-term goals necessitating the replacement of animals in farming 
wherever feasible alternatives exist.  
In terms of preference, given that the urgency of applying the 3R principles to a practice 
that harms animals is proportional to the necessity of the practice, it follows that the detrimental 
impacts of farming are so significant that the application of 3R is more urgent in the farming 
sector than it is in research.
200
 Moreover, as the aim of research lies in saving lives and the one of 
animal farming is about culinary pleasure, farming is certainly less necessary than research. 
Therefore, if the absolute replacement is the accepted imperative in research, there should be an 




Refinement, reduction, and replacement have encountered worldwide recognition by the majority 
of states as expressed in their legal systems. The legal manifestations of the 3R principles in 
research have generated remarkable successes: conditions have been ameliorated, numbers have 
been reduced, and unnecessary experiments have been avoided by means of replacement.  
By contrast, farm animals are discriminated from a legal point of view. Although they 
represent 98% of all domesticated animals, they lack either meaningful regulation or legal 
apprehension at all. The findings manifest that 3R in research were introduced for the primary 
purpose of reducing animal suffering, yet the capability to suffer is experienced by both farm and 
research animals. Major conventions concerning the treatment of animals, national laws, codes, 
and practices recognize animal sentience and draw no distinction in this regard as to the 
designated use of the animals for humans. Based on this global recognition, as well as the global 
enshrinement of the principle of unnecessary animal suffering (which is adopted by the European 
Union, the Council of Europe, Australia, Austria, Canada, France, Germany, India, Israel, 
Norway, the Philippines, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the U.S., and 
others
202
), it follows that there exists no legitimate justification to deprive farm animals of equal 
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3R application. As the Council of Europe specified, ‘man has a moral obligation to respect all 
animals and to have due consideration for their capacity for suffering and memory.’
203
 Also the 
World Organisation for Animal Health recognizes a responsibility to ensure the welfare of 
animals to the greatest extent possible.
204
 In consideration of the aim of research to save lives and 
the one of animal farming to create culinary pleasure, the application of 3R to farming is even 
more exigent, requiring scrutiny on the grounds of consistency. 
The subsequent application of 3R to farming elucidates the main issues. Although 
Switzerland’s provisions have set a good example on refinement to be geared to other states’ 
legislation, the massive demand for animal products gives rise to a host of new problems that 
refinement alone is incapable of solving: environmental pollution, world hunger, human health 
concerns, and in particular detrimental consequences for animals. The reduction of animal 
products hence stands to reason. However, its implementation and dissatisfying consequences 
unavoidably challenge the necessity of animal products. Under the aegis of the principle of 
replacement, the principle of proportionality, consisting of the sub-principles of suitability, 
necessity, and proportionality strictu sensu, is applied. Suitability of animal product consumption 
may by its nature depend on subjective judgments, whereas necessity should not be interpreted 
dependent on society’s perception, but pay deference to the readily available alternatives. Meat, 
eggs, and dairy products represent the type of food that leave the biggest ecological footprint and 
as splendid alternatives are readily available, the consumption of animal products and the 
resulting animal suffering is avoidable. At last, proportionality strictu sensu poses a difficult task 
of weighing disparate interests, where the interests of one subject a priori are deemed higher than 
those of the other subject. Such a disregard of the principle of proportionality strictu sensu can 
only be justified if the excessive restriction is of high importance. The qualitative balance of 
interests elucidates that the harms humans would endure by not consuming animal products is 
fundamentally incomparable to the harm inflicted upon farm animals, since interest in remaining 
alive certainly rates higher than interest in eating, dressing, and being entertained in a certain, 
easily remunerable manner. The replacement of animal products prima facie may appear radical, 
but must be compared with 3R in research. Society and the law accept and foster the demand to 
replace potentially life-saving research, whereas it commonly is deemed radical to replace easily 
substitutable culinary pleasure, which is actually the weaker demand. Causing unnecessary pain, 
on the other hand, is the most eccentric of all moral principles. Additionally, given research’s aim 
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to save lives and animal farming’s aim to have culinary pleasure, farming certainly is less 
necessary than research. And therefore, if the absolute replacement is the accepted imperative in 
research, there should be an even stronger imperative for replacement in farming. These 
fundamental findings are not only of theoretical character but have in fact been applied by the 
High Court of India and the Israeli Supreme Court. 
Governments therefore should at least introduce one major analogy to 3R in research, 
namely the duty to further alternatives to current industrial farming methods. Alternatives to 
conventional farming that overcome the use of animals should enjoy privileged furtherance in 
order to ensure future food security, sustainability, public health and to master the recognition of 
animal sentience and the correspondent avowal to the reduction of animal suffering. Such an 
approach pays full regard to the changing societal sensitivities to animal cruelty, as well as to the 
fact that ‘animals have an intrinsic value which must be respected’ and ‘should always be treated 
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